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Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism: Why Suing
Terrorists May Not be the Most Effective Way to Advance
United States Foreign Policy Objectives
Drew WatkinsI

“In our system, the truth behind those facts deserves to be presented in a
court—a court of law where fairness and justice will be assured. This measure does
not prejudge a verdict or issue a judgment. It gives both sides a fair day in court.” 2
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INTRODUCTION
The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) was enacted to allow
the families of the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks to sue the Saudi
Arabian government for its alleged involvement in the 9/11 attacks.1 It was passed
by Congress on September 28, 2016, with overwhelming bipartisan support.2
President Obama had previously vetoed the legislation, on September 23, 2016,
after it passed through both houses without a single dissenting vote, but Congress
acted quickly to override his veto by a vote of 97–1 in the Senate and 348–77 in the
House of Representatives.3 While many argued against the passage of JASTA, the
families of 9/11 victims who lost loved ones on September 11, 2001, lobbied
Congress and President Obama to pass this legislation and send a clear message to
the world: “If you support a terrorist attack against U.S. citizens in the United
States of America, we will hold you accountable in a U.S. court.” 4
The passage of this Act was viewed as an attempt to bring justice to the families
of 9/11 victims and hold the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia accountable for its potential
involvement in the terrorist activities of that day.5 However, the scope of JASTA
was never limited to the September 11th attacks, and, as a result, it has much
broader implications for sovereign immunity as a whole.6 The protections afforded
by sovereign immunity are far reaching and complex. It is under this protection
that our military service men and women can act around the globe without fear of
litigation for the actions they take at the request of our government. It is also the
concept of sovereign immunity, however, that has shielded other state actors from
liability for their involvement in terrorist acts carried out on United States soil.7
Since 1976, the United States has adhered to the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, which allows states to create limited exceptions to the immunity
afforded to sovereigns.8 Supporters of JASTA argue that this act simply continues


1
See generally Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, § 2, 130 Stat. 852
(2016).
2
Seung Min Kim, Congress Hands Obama First Veto Override, POLITICO (Sept. 28, 2016,
1:45 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/senate-jasta-228841 [https://perma.cc/6MHWS5GY].
3
Id.; Seung Min Kim, Obama Vetoes Saudi 9/11 Bill, Politico (Sept. 23, 2016, 5:35 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/obama-jasta-228548 [https://perma.cc/FDC2-E36V].
4
Message from 9/11 Committee, PASSJASTA.ORG, http://passjasta.org/message-from-911committee/ [https://perma.cc/3X7S-8LUQ] (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
5
Message from 9/11 Committee, supra note 4; see also Terry Strada et al., 9/11 Families Pen
Letter Urging Obama to OK Anti-Terrorism Bill, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2016, 5:41 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/9-11-families-pen-letter-urging-obama-anti-terrorism-billarticle-1.2787663 [https://perma.cc/KZE7-CR7X].
6
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, § 7, 130 Stat. 852, 855 (2016).
7
See, e.g., James Risen, Terrorist Claims Return Sept. 11 Suit to Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jBnmur [https://perma.cc/VAC5-GF9R].
8
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2012)).
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that tradition by creating another limited immunity exception.9 JASTA critics
argue, however, that this exception can be used by other states to justify similar
legislation which would allow them to sue the United States and its men and
women operating abroad.10 It was primarily this concern that led President Obama
to veto the legislation.11 Despite these concerns, Congress chose to override the
Presidential veto and pass JASTA into law.
Principles of sovereign immunity have stood as a cornerstone of international
law and intergovernmental relations for hundreds of years. There are serious
concerns to be weighed and evaluated when looking at legislation that seeks to
waive or alter this fundamental tenant of global relations. While the United States
Congress almost certainly abdicated its responsibility for weighing these concerns
when it passed JASTA,12 these concerns must continue to be evaluated and
considered for any new legislation that may impact sovereign immunity. Congress
has a duty to protect our national security interests and to take immediate steps to
minimize any international response to the passage of JASTA.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of sovereign immunity in the United
States and the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which
codifies limited exceptions to the sovereign immunities doctrine under United
States law. Part II discusses the background of terrorism legislation in this country
and what led to the passage of JASTA. Part III addresses the unintended
consequences of this legislation and looks at arguments from both sides of the
debate to determine whether JASTA is good policy. Part IV argues that even if the
underlying policy of JASTA is laudable ⎯ to hold terrorists accountable for their
action on United States soil ⎯ its methods for achieving this goal will be largely
ineffective. Lastly, Part V discusses how the United States should advance
sovereign immunity principles now that JASTA has been signed into law,
including options for fixing JASTA, stopping the erosion of sovereign immunity
around the world, and other ways to effectively bring the perpetrators of terrorist
attacks on U.S. soil to justice.


9
See Lee Whitesell, JASTA Not as Bad as It Seems, NEW JURIST (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://newjurist.com/jasta-not-as-bad-as-it-seems.html [https://perma.cc/B9N9-WUBP].
10
162 CONG. REC. S6171–72 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2016) (letter from Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN)
et al. to Senators Cornyn and Schumer).
11
See 162 CONG. REC. S6071–72 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2016) (President Obama’s veto message
regarding JASTA).
12
See 162 CONG. REC. S6071–72; see also 162 CONG. REC. S6171–72 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2016)
(“[C]oncerns have been raised regarding potential unintended consequences that may result from
[JASTA] for the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”).

2017–2018

Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism

149


I. HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The concept of sovereign immunity traces back to English common law.13
Based on the idea that “the king can do no wrong,” sovereign immunity developed
as a judicial doctrine that limited the king’s exposure to suit.14 In the broadest
sense, sovereign immunity provides a government with protection from being sued
without its consent.15 Troy Daniels explains, “Historically, foreign states enjoyed
absolute sovereign immunity under ‘traditional precepts of international law.’”16
“Absolute sovereign immunity is based on the long recognized concept ‘that each
domestic sovereign waives its judicial power over foreign sovereigns in the interest
of compelling intercourse among them . . . .’”17 In the United States, the Supreme
Court has recognized sovereign immunity as an important international legal
principle since the early 1800s.18 As Justice Marshall declared, a “common interest
impelling [sovereign states] to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good
offices with each other,” requires the application of sovereign immunity.19
Eventually, the doctrine of sovereign immunity adapted from an absolute
immunity to a restrictive immunity that recognized a few exceptions for
commercial activities.20 This has been the prevailing international view for several
decades, as noted recently by the International Court of Justice.21 In 1976,
Congress codified this principle of international law through the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA).22 These principles have served the United States well. Due
to the shear breadth of our global commitments around the world, the sovereign
immunity doctrine serves to protect U.S. property that could otherwise be subject
to foreign judgments.23 Likewise, principles of sovereign immunity shield U.S.
agents, service members, diplomats, and other assets from liability for actions
which foreign actors may not like and may consider illegal.24 It is easy to see that


13
John B. Ostrow & Joseph H. Lowe, Sovereign Immunity, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1297, 1299
(1979).
14
Troy Daniels, An Analysis of the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 4 DET. C. L.
J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 175, 176 (1995).
15
Sovereign Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
16
Daniels, supra note 16, at 176.
17
Id.
18
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 116–17, 135–37 (1812).
19
Id. at 137.
20
Daniels, supra note 16, at 175.
21
Jurisdictional Immunities of State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶ 59–61 (Feb. 3)
(discussing the scope of sovereign immunity), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/143/14320120203-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/98X4-6QHT].
22
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611).
23
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 2040 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution & Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 64 (2016) (statement of
Paul B. Stephan, Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School).
24
See id.
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there is no bigger beneficiary to the principles of sovereign immunity than the
United States.25
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND TERRORISM LITIGATION IN THE UNITED
STATES

A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
Pamela Sue Malkin explains, “In 1976, the United States adopted the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) which altered American law from the theory of
absolute sovereign immunity to the restrictive concept of sovereign immunity.”26
The FSIA represents a “codification of international law,” and provides for a
number of exceptions to immunity “recognized by international practice.”27 “Under
the FSIA, foreign sovereigns are immune from suit for their actions, unless one of
the specific, enumerated exceptions to immunity applies.”28
The FSIA was “[e]nacted in response to increased foreign governmental
involvement in the [global] marketplace.”29 This legislation gave U.S. federal courts
the authority to hear cases involving foreign governments when they “engage[d] in
‘commercial activity’ which has a direct effect in the United States.” 30 The FSIA
was never intended to violate international law or customs. On the contrary,
President Gerald Ford made clear after signing the FSIA into law that it
“continues the long-standing commitment of the United States to seek a stable
international order under the law.”31
In 1996, the FSIA was amended to permit litigation for acts of terrorism
perpetrated by countries designated as “state sponsor[s] of terrorism.”32 In order to
minimize any reciprocal effects of such an amendment, it was written narrowly to
limit its application to countries the Secretary of State determines to have


25

See id.
Pamela Sue Malkin, Case Comment, Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490
(11th Cir. 1986), 11 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 251, 251 (1987).
27
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199–200
(2007); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012 & Supp. III 2016).
28
Felice A. Glennon, Case Comment, Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d
1018 (9th Cir. 1987), 12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 703, 703 (1989). Most notably, the exceptions to
sovereign immunity enumerated in the FSIA cover commercial activities and activities which result in
money damages and occur entirely within the United States, the so called “territorial tort” exception. See
generally 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2012).
29
Daniels, supra note 14, at 175.
30
Id.
31
Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
(October 22, 1976), Gerhard Peters & John T. Wooley, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6506 [https://perma.cc/K8VH-36D9] (last visited Oct. 14,
2017).
32
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996) (repealed 2008 and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012)); see
also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31258, SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES
BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 1 (2008).
26
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“repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.”33 But even this
narrowly tailored amendment does not comport with generally accepted
international law.34 As a result, other governments have labeled the United States a
sponsor of terrorism, making U.S. agents and agencies operating abroad potential
targets for foreign litigation.35
The threat of foreign litigation, as a result of reciprocal erosions of sovereign
immunity, is not simply theoretical. At least two countries have passed legislation
to remove U.S. sovereign immunity in their courts in response to legislation
enacted by the United States.36 Cuba has allowed suits to be brought against the
United States for human rights violations, which has resulted in billions of dollars
in damages against the United States.37 Iran has also allowed lawsuits to proceed
against the United States for what Iran perceives to be terrorist activities.38 In fact,
one Iranian businessman who received a half a billion dollar judgment against the
United States reportedly tried to attach the vacant U.S. embassy in Tehran to
satisfy his judgment.39
Additionally, several suits have been brought against U.S. officials in Europe
over the last decade for their roles in fighting terrorism. In 2009, for example,
several American CIA and State Department officials were convicted in absentia by


33
28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012). The countries that are designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism
change periodically. Currently, this list includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria. State Sponsors of Terrorism,
U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm [https://perma.cc/FWU5-7L2Q] (last
visited Oct. 14, 2017). North Korea was added back to the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism on
November 20, 2017 after being removed in 2008. Michael D. Shear & David E. Sanger, Trump
Returns North Korea to List of State Sponsors of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/us/politics/north-korea-trump-terror.html. Cuba was removed
from the list most recently, in 2015.Julie Hirschfeld Davis, U.S. Removes Cuba from State-Sponsored
Terrorism
List,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/us/us-removes-cuba-from-state-terrorismlist.html [https://perma.cc/66FH-YULW].
34
See Evaluating the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on S. 2930 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8–9 (2010) (statement of
John B. Bellinger III, Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP).
35
Id.
36
ELSEA, supra note 32, at 56.
37
Id.
38
Id.; see also Michael Theodoulou, Tehran Court Rules Against US, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Feb. 3, 2003), https://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0203/p06s01-wome.html [https://perma.cc/VCT59G3R].
39
Mike Theodoulou, Iran Court to Strip U.S. of Embassy?, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 3, 2006,
8:48
PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/iran-court-to-strip-us-of-embassy/
[https://perma.cc/6E45-PWSV]. The United States argued that, “under the Vienna Convention,
diplomatic premises,” including its embassy in Tehran, were “immune from court judgments.” Id. But,
the Iranian businessman who obtained the judgment countered that the U.S. lost that international
protection when it adopted the 1996 amendment to the FSIA, which allows lawsuits in U.S. courts
against designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, including Iran. Id. An Iranian official denied that the
U.S. embassy had been seized, noting that the judicial sale of embassy property is a violation of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. ELSEA, supra note 32, at 66–67, 67 n. 252. This charade
illustrates that these judgements are largely symbolic and reinforces the ineffective nature of
international litigation to resolve disputes against sovereigns.
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an Italian court in connection with the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program.40
Although none of these officials have served time for their convictions, having all
fled the country before the sentences were handed down,41 these cases cause great
concern for American men and women working overseas who worry their actions
may not be afforded full diplomatic protection.
The threat of foreign litigation has become so pervasive that the Department
of Justice has an entire division responsible for “protect[ing] U.S. interests in all
litigation pending in foreign courts.”42 According to the Office of Foreign
Litigation, most of the cases it handles “are defensive” and “reflect the wide range
of the U.S. Government’s international activities.”43 Many of its cases relate to
defending actions that arise from United States agency or military activity in
foreign countries.44 The Office of Foreign Litigation estimates that at any given
time its lawyers are representing the United States in around 1,000 lawsuits in over
100 countries.45 If the United States continues to invite foreign suits through
additional waivers of sovereign immunity, the amount of foreign litigation to which
the United States is a party can be expected to grow exponentially.

B. In re Terrorist Attacks Litigation
For the last decade, families of the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks have
attempted to bring suit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its alleged
involvement in those attacks. In 2005, a pair of federal district court rulings
dismissed claims against the Saudi government relying on the “discretionary
function” clause of the FSIA.46 Although the FSIA provides an exception to


40
See Rachel Donadio, Italy Convicts 23 Americans for C.I.A. Renditions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/world/europe/05italy.html
[https://perma.cc/X4FPFD83].
41
Ian Shapira, Ex-CIA Officer Jailed in Portugal for Her Alleged Role in Kidnapping a Terrorism
Suspect, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ex-cia-officer-jailed-inportugal-for-her-alleged-role-in-kidnapping-a-terrorism-suspect/2017/02/22/b3fcf94a-f906-11e69845-576c69081518_story.html?utm_term=.b2be4ca33422
[https://perma.cc/PKD4-HDYG].
Although those who were convicted have not served any time on their sentences, Sabrina de Sousa, who
worked for the CIA at the time, spent ten days in a Portuguese prison after traveling to Portugal in
2015. Andrei Khalip & Jonathan Landay, Ex-CIA Spy Freed in Portugal, Avoids Extradition over
Kidnapping, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-us-cia-pardonidUSKBN1683ZC [https://perma.cc/KXS2-UHX6]. In addition to the stigma that these convictions
have created for the men and women who were serving their country, the convictions have also
prevented them from traveling abroad, fearful that they may be apprehended and extradited to Italy. See
id.
42
See Office of Foreign Litigation, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/civil/office-foreignlitigation [https://perma.cc/DAT5-KGVX] (last updated Aug. 1, 2017).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 801–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
[hereinafter In re Terrorist Attacks I]; In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d
539, 553–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter In re Terrorist Attacks II].
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sovereign immunity when damage from tortious conduct occurs in the United
States, the “discretionary function” clause disallows such suits when the tort results
from discretionary conduct on the part of the foreign sovereign.47 The district
courts concluded that any action taken by Saudi Arabia, including any financial
payments made to entities linked to terrorism, constituted discretionary functions.48
The Second Circuit affirmed these decisions, but on different grounds.49 The
Court of Appeals held that the 1996 Amendment to the FSIA, allowing suits
against state sponsors of terrorism, was the sole means for bringing a terrorism
related action.50 Because Saudi Arabia was never designated a “State Sponsor of
Terrorism,” they could not be sued for terrorism-related claims under any of the
other FSIA exceptions to immunity.51 The plaintiffs sought certiorari, and the
United States Supreme Court called on then Solicitor General, Elena Kagan, to
offer her views on the matter.52 It was the opinion of the Solicitor General that
certiorari
be
denied
because—although a foreign sovereign who was not designated as a State Sponsor
of Terrorism could be sued for terrorism-related tortious conduct that resulted in
injury in the United States—such suit could only be sustained under the FSIA
when the entire tort took place “within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.”53 As the government argued, even if the allegations against Saudi Arabia
are true, much of the alleged tortious conduct occurred overseas, and therefore,
would not fall under the FSIA exception for tortious conduct.54 The Supreme
Court denied certiorari.55
While this would have been the end of the Terrorist Attacks litigation, the
Second Circuit revived the matter in Doe v. Bin Laden by rendering a holding
inconsistent with that reached in In re Terrorist Attacks III.56 In Doe, the Court of
Appeals held that the tortious conduct and State Sponsor of Terrorism exceptions
under the FSIA provided independent grounds to hold foreign sovereigns liable in


47
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2012) (allowing suits against foreign sovereigns when the
tortious conduct results in damage in the U.S.), with 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (containing the
“discretionary function” clause, disallowing such suits where the actions constitute a “discretionary
function regardless of whether the discretion be abused”).
48
In re Terrorist Attacks I, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 803–04; In re Terrorist Attacks II, 392 F. Supp. 2d
at 555–56.
49
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83, 86–90 (2d Cir. 2008).
[hereinafter In re Terrorist Attacks III].
50
Id. at 87–89.
51
Id. at 89–90.
52
See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Fed. Ins. Co. v. Saudi Arabia (2009)
(No. 08–640).
53
Id. at 1–3, 11–13.
54
Id. at 13–14.
55
In re Terrorist Attacks III, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 935 (2009).
56
Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64, 70–71, 70 n.10 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We recognize that this holding
is inconsistent with that reached by . . . our Court in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2011,
F.3d 71, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) . . . .”).
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United States courts.57 Following this ruling, the plaintiffs in the Terrorist Attacks
litigation filed a motion for relief from the judgment that was subsequently granted
in December 2013, and the case was remanded to district court for additional
proceedings.58 Finally, in September 2015, the district court once more dismissed
the litigation because, as the Solicitor General argued in her brief, the tortious
conduct did not take place entirely within the territorial United States.59

C. The Anti-Terrorism Act
A parallel issue in the arena of terrorism litigation arises under the
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), which allows United States nationals to obtain treble
damages against those responsible for injuries that arise out of “an act of
international terrorism.”60 Pertaining to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the ATA does not make clear if it allows for theories of secondary liability such as
aiding and abetting.61 Both the Second and Seventh Circuits have held that claims
based on secondary liability are excluded under the ATA.62
Although most of the recent terrorism related litigation has been focused on the
FSIA, some 9/11 families have made efforts to hold individuals accountable under
the ATA.63 These court decisions, combined with the realities of the 9/11 attacks,
prevented justice from being served in the eyes of the families engaged in these
litigation battles.64 It is against this backdrop of complex and strenuous sovereign
immunities litigation that Congress sought to address what many perceived was a
loophole in the law.


57
Doe, 663 F.3d at 70 (“[T]he terrorism exception, rather than limiting the jurisdiction conferred
by the noncommercial tort exception, provides an additional basis for jurisdiction.”).
58
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 741 F.3d 353, 355–56, 359 (2d Cir. 2013).
59
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 134 F. Supp. 3d 774, 781, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 2015);
see also supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
60
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).
61
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2013) (“In the ATA, § 2333 is silent as to
the permissibility of aiding and abetting liability.”).
62
See, e.g., id. at 97–98; Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685,
93 (7th Cir. 2008).
63
See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
64
See infra note 96–98 and accompanying text.
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III. JUSTICE AGAINST SPONSORS OF TERRORISM ACT (JASTA)

A. Background and Enactment
In 2016, Congress enacted JASTA:
[T]o provide civil litigants with the broadest possible basis, . . . to seek
relief against persons, entities, and foreign countries, wherever acting
and wherever they may be found, that have provided material support,
directly or indirectly, to foreign organizations or persons that engage in
terrorist activities against the United States.65

In enacting this legislation, Congress directed the statute at:
Persons, entities, or countries that knowingly or recklessly contribute
material support or resources, directly or indirectly, to persons or
organizations that pose a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism
that threaten the security of nationals of the United States or the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States,
necessarily direct their conduct at the United States, and should
reasonably anticipate being brought to court in the United States to
answer for such activities.66

The passage of this bi-partisan bill was in response to the Terrorism Attack
decisions discussed earlier in this Note and a direct result of a long and harrowing
fight by the families of the victims of 9/11 to hold the government of Saudi Arabia
accountable for their alleged involvement.67 In an open letter to President Obama
encouraging him to sign JASTA into law, 9/11 families wrote:
We and so many other families have fought for years to know all of the
truth about 9/11. We have fought to ensure that anyone and any entity
that may have had a responsible role in the murder of 3,000 people in
New York, at the Pentagon and across a field in Pennsylvania is held to
account for their actions.68

not

However, President Obama, citing numerous national security concerns, would
sign JASTA into law.69 Congress acted swiftly and, in a


65
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, § 2(b), 130 Stat. 852, 853
(2016).
66
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act § 2(a)(6).
67
See supra Section II.B.
68
Strada et al., supra note 5.
69
Press Release, Veto Message from the President – S.2040 to the Senate of the United States,
Office of the Press Sec’y (Sept. 23, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/09/23/veto-message-president-s2040 [https://perma.cc/LX9X-ULVN].
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bi-partisan vote, overrode the presidential veto, delivering the first and only veto
override of President Obama’s tenure.70
The White House called the override “the single most embarrassing thing the
United States Senate has done possibly since 1983.”71 Senator Chuck Schumer (DN.Y.), a chief sponsor of the bill, responded that “[o]verriding a presidential veto is
something we don’t take lightly, but it was important in this case that the families
of the victims of 9/11 be allowed to pursue justice, even if that pursuit causes some
diplomatic discomforts.”72 Despite this unprecedented action, it was quickly
apparent that several Senators who had voted to override President Obama’s veto
held serious reservations about the potential “unintended consequences” of the
legislation.73
From the beginning, JASTA was viewed as focusing primarily on the alleged
involvement of Saudi Arabia in the terrorist attacks of September 11.74 However,
the legislation was not drafted to apply specifically to those events or actors.75
While
some
supporters,
like
Senator
John
Cornyn
(R-TX), believed the bill was “narrowly tailored” to deter any reciprocal
legislation,76 that opinion was not shared by many national security advisors and


70
Congress Rejects Obama Veto of 9/11 Bill, in First Override of Presidency, FOX NEWS
(Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/09/29/congress-rejects-obama-veto-911-billin-first-override-presidency.html [https://perma.cc/2SJW-Z2CD].
71
Kim, supra note 2. The White House’s statement was in response to reports that the veto
override vote for JASTA (97–1 in the Senate) was the most overwhelming since Congress voted to
override President Ronal Reagan in 1983 with a vote of 95–0. Jordan Fabian, White House Lashes Out
at ‘Embarrassing’ Senate Veto Override, HILL (Sept. 28, 2016, 1:45 PM), http://originnyi.thehill.com/homenews/administration/298290-white-house-lashes-out-at-embarrassing-senate-veto
[https://perma.cc/HVN8-ND26]. The vote in 1983 overrode President Reagan’s veto of a bill that gave
a few acres of land to six retired couples who learned a surveying error resulted in them paying for land
that was technically still government property. Dale Russakoff, Elderly Oregonians Win Battle on Hill,
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 1983), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/10/26/elderlyoregonians-win-battle-on-hill/c2eeb909-ec05-4532-886b-dbca63ec407a/?utm_term=.b9e57c1bfb5d
[https://perma.cc/JD2S-YMVC].
Dale Russakoff, Reagan Veto Criticized as an Insensitive Act, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 1983),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1983/10/22/reagan-veto-criticized-as-an-insensitiveact/94ae51d3-724e-4e44-89ff-a3a5c5d56e44/?utm_term=.3c1fbc0b8914
[https://perma.cc/MN4WRLQZ]. The 1983 bill seems hardly comparable to this monumental legislation that strips sovereign
immunity protections from foreign nations.
72
Richard Lardner, Congress Rebukes Obama, Overrides Veto of 9/11 Legislation, KSL.COM
(Sept.
28,
2016,
4:01
PM),
http://www.ksl.com/index.php?sid=41649553&nid=481
[https://perma.cc/6USA-C9L2].
73
See, e.g., Letter from 28 Senators, on anticipated override of President Obama’s veto of S.2040,
to
Senators
Cornyn
and
Schumer
(Sept.
28,
2016),
https://www.corker.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d8eee900-5ffc-4204-a4f18072c104d9c2/Bipartisan%20Senate%20JASTA%20Letter%20092816.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Z464JQN] (noting that “concerns have been raised regarding potential unintended consequences that may
result from [JASTA] for the national security and foreign policy of the United States”).
74
See Kim, supra note 2.
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See generally Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, 130 Stat. 852
(2016).
76
See Lardner, supra note 72.
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foreign policy experts.77 These national security concerns formed the basis for
President Obama’s veto of the proposed legislation.

B. A History of JASTA and What It Actually Does
Before analyzing the arguments against JASTA and concerns about unintended
consequences of JASTA, it is necessary to consider the history of JASTA
legislation and discuss the actual implications of the legislation. Draft versions of
JASTA had been circulating in the Senate for several years, but it was not until it
became apparent that the families of the 9/11 victims would not be able to seek
justice under existing law that the Congress finally acted. As this Note later
demonstrates, however, the version of JASTA that was ultimately passed is a stark
departure from the original bill introduced in the 114th Congress and will prove to
be largely ineffective at addressing its stated goals.78 For now, we will simply look at
how the legislation evolved.
On September 16, 2015, the original JASTA bill was introduced in the
Senate.79 That bill would later pass out of the Senate Judiciary Committee as an
amendment in the nature of a substitution.80 This was the first version of JASTA
debated by the full Senate, and it received a lot of attention because of its potential
implications for sovereign immunity and United States foreign relations.81 There
were four main parts to this bill that would have amended the FSIA and the ATA.
First, this bill would have reversed the recent judicial decision which held that the
FSIA tort exception only applied to tortious conduct occurring entirely within the
territorial United States.82 Second, it would have introduced clarifying language in
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See, e.g., Letter from Ash Carter, Sec’y, Dep’t of Def., to William Thornberry, Chairman,
Comm. on Armed Servs., U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 26, 2016),
http://static.politico.com/07/ab/a362dde34184add8a98ea6bd7ce7/carter-9-11-billletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/84Y3-D23R] (“While we are sympathetic to the intent of JASTA, its
potential second- and third-order consequences could be devastating to the Department and its Service
members and could undermine our important counterterrorism efforts abroad.”); see also Open Letter
from William Cohen, former Sec’y, Dep’t of Def., et al., to the President of the United States and
Members
of
Congress
(undated),
https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/letter_obama_congress_jasta.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XPW4P3K2].
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See infra Part IV.
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161 CONG. REC. S6699 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2015) (Introduction of Bills and Joint Resolutions).
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162 CONG. REC. S575 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2016) (Reports of Committees); see also Justice Against
Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 114th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 3,
2016).
81
See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti, Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout if Congress Passes 9/11 Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabiawarns-of-economic-fallout-if-congress-passes-9-11-bill.html?mcubz=1
[https://perma.cc/ZPS44BYF].
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Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 114th Cong. § 3 (as reported by
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 3, 2016) (amending the FSIA tort exception in
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) to apply “regardless of where the underlying tortious act or omission occurs”); see
also supra Section II.B.
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the ATA to make it applicable in secondary liability cases which arise out of acts of
international terrorism.83 Third, the bill would have allowed personal jurisdiction
“to the maximum extent permissible under the 5th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States” for acts of international terrorism which create a
cause of action under the ATA.84 And finally, it would have removed the
prohibition under the ATA for bringing suits against foreign states and their
officers and employees acting within their official capacity.85
The version of JASTA which passed out of committee was hotly contested and
received a torrent of criticism for its sweeping abolitions of sovereign immunity
principles.86 But, when the Senate took up the bill for a floor vote, it was not the
original version that would be voted on, but another amendment in the form of a
substitution offered by Senator John Cornyn, one of the bill’s chief sponsors.87
This bill, which was the version that would eventually be voted into law, included a
number of changes that essentially destroyed the brunt of the force behind JASTA.
Because these changes are explicated in further detail later in the Note, only a quick
summary of the changes are provided in this section. Although the final version of
JASTA allowed terrorism litigation against states that were not sponsors of
terrorism, it limited the ability to bring such suits in other ways and created a
provision allowing the United States government to stay any case brought under
JASTA in perpetuity.88 Essentially, the version of JASTA that was signed into law
symbolized an erosion of sovereign immunity with all of the foreign policy and
national security concerns that come with such an act; but, it lacked any teeth that
would allow it to accomplish its stated purpose.89

C. Arguments in Support of and Against JASTA and Concerns of Unintended
Consequences
“I am going to support the veto override, but it is not without concern for the
potential unintended consequences. . . . [T]he risk of shielding the perpetrators of
terrorism from justice outweighs the risks on how other countries might respond to
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S. 2040 § 4 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2333 to allow aiding and abetting liability in actions for
injury that arise from “an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an
organization that has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization”); see also supra Section II.C.
84
S. 2040 § 5. Effectively, this section was designed to overrule recent circuit court decisions which
had held that families of 9/11 victims lacked personal jurisdiction over certain Saudi defendants. See,
e.g.,
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on
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2001,
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659,
679–82 (2d Cir. 2013).
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S. 2040 § 6; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2337 (2012).
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See, e.g., Mazetti, supra note 81.
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114 CONG. REC. S2846–48 (daily ed. May 17, 2016).
88
Compare Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 114th Cong. (as reported by S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 3, 2016), with Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No.
114–222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016).
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See infra Part IV.
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and perhaps compromise U.S. interests.”90 Even before the veto override votes had
been counted, members of Congress from both parties were speaking out about the
“unintended consequences” of the legislation they were about to pass.91 This section
examines various arguments against the passage of JASTA and the counterarguments in favor.
i. JASTA Places Strategic Foreign Policy Decisions in the Hands of the Courts
Rather Than National Security Experts
As President Obama argued in his veto message to Congress, JASTA removes
responsibility for handling terrorist activities from the hands of foreign policy and
national security professionals and places it in the hands of private litigants and the
courts.92 Foreign policy considerations, including the United States response to
terrorism, are largely the responsibility of the executive branch with input from
Congress. These decisions usually require quick and decisive action of the kind the
President is more adept at performing. It is for this reason that the State
Department, intelligence agencies, and the National Security Council are all
organized under the executive, with legislators providing key oversight.93 The
President, with input from his national security team, already has the power to
label a foreign government a State Sponsor of Terrorism; such a designation brings
with it a litany of effective United States responses, including a partial stripping of
sovereign immunity.94
In contrast to the careful and thoughtful decision—with input from a myriad of
national
security,
foreign
policy,
and
intelligence
professionals—to designate a foreign government as a State Sponsor of Terrorism,
JASTA allows any foreign sovereign to be stripped of its sovereign immunity based
solely on the accusations of a litigant in a United States court.95 This can invite
consequential decisions on incomplete or inaccurate information, which may in fact
run counter to United States foreign policy objectives.
Consider, for example, a recent case that involved private litigants attempting to
collect a judgment against the Palestinian National Authority (“PNA”) in a United
States court. The litigants had obtained a judgment against the PNA and the
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162 CONG. REC. S6169 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2016) (statement by Sen. Cardin on voting to
override President Obama’s veto).
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See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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Press Release, Veto Message from the President – S.2040, supra note 69.
93
As argued by former U.N. Ambassador, John Bolton, and former U.S. Attorney General,
General Michael Mukasey, “J[ASTA] shifts authority for a huge component of national security from
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Bolton & Michael B. Mukasey, The Folly of Fighting Terrorism by Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.
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Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) under the ATA, which—because of
the
treble
damages
clause
in
that
statute—totaled $655.5 million.96 The problem, the United States government
provides hundreds of millions of dollars a year to support the PNA, largely as an
effort to promote stability in the region and deter other terrorist groups.97 When
the litigants moved to satisfy their judgment by requiring the PNA to post a bond,
the United States government filed a declaration with the court to persuade them
to waive or reduce the bond.98
In response to concerns over JASTA’s effect on the executive branch’s ability to
alleviate national security issues, the supporters of JASTA argued that President
Obama’s veto constituted a shift in his administration’s previous views on allowing
victims of terrorist attacks to seek justice in United States courts.99 In support of
this proposition they point to the same declaration submitted in the PNA case
discussed above. Rather than looking to the underlying case and the foreign policy
implications that have arisen from the litigation, they observe that the Deputy
Secretary of State insists that “[i]mposing civil liability on those who commit or
sponsor acts of terrorism is an important means of deterring and defeating terrorist
activity.”100 Regardless of the utopian ideals for countering terrorism that Deputy
Secretary Blinken discusses, the PNA case and the declaration itself actually
present the unintended consequences that can arise from such private litigation.
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U.S. Government Intervenes in Lawsuit Payments over Palestinian Terror Attacks, GUARDIAN
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antithetical to U.S. foreign policy objectives.
99
Response to the Message of the President Accompanying His Veto of the Justice Against
Sponsors
of
Terrorism
Act,
PASSJASTA.ORG
(Sept.
26,
2016),
http://passjasta.org/2016/09/response-message-president-accompanying-veto-justice-sponsorsterrorism-act/ [https://perma.cc/56HB-BZ4L].
100
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 98, at 6a.

2017–2018

Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism

161


ii. The Erosion of Sovereign Immunity Leaves the United States Vulnerable to
Reciprocal Treatment by Other Countries
Sovereign immunity has served as a bedrock principle of international relations
for hundreds of years.101 As President Obama argued in his veto message, JASTA
disrupts this foundational principle and, if applied globally, will have disastrous
implications for United States national interests.102 Reciprocity is a key tenant of
foreign relations; indeed, other countries already have laws in place that allow titfor-tat erosions of sovereign immunity, and such laws are in conformity with
international practices.103 Past experiences have shown, when Congress passes
legislation that makes it easier for private litigants to sue foreign sovereigns in
United States courts, no matter how targeted or narrow the legislation is, we can
expect to face reciprocal treatment from other countries.104
In response to this concern, supporters of JASTA noted that the final version of
the bill that passed through Congress was the result of careful consideration, and
amendments were designed specifically to ameliorate any concerns of reciprocity.105
Specifically, amendments were made to allow the United States government to stay
a lawsuit “if the State Department verifie[d] the administration [was] engaged in
good faith discussions” to resolve the dispute.106 Additionally, the law was amended
to require a defendant to establish that the foreign government acted with more
than mere negligence; that it acted recklessly or intentionally.107 Supporters argued
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that the passage of JASTA by wide vote margins and with bipartisan support, after
these amendments, demonstrated Congress’s view that the revisions had addressed
any legitimate concerns and that JASTA was good policy.108
The 9/11 Committee, a group of 9/11 families and JASTA supporters,
expressed the view that JASTA was narrowly tailored and applied only to acts of
international terrorism caused by “a foreign state.”109 This caveat, the group
concluded, makes the law inapplicable to military activities and actions by
individual foreign agents.110 Because of the law’s narrow application, the
Committee argues that there is no legitimate threat of reciprocal statutes being
enacted against the United States.111 Instead, the group believes President Obama’s
real concern is not grounded in the international law concept of reciprocity, but
rather the fear that other nations will engage in “acts of provocation and
aggression” toward the United States government’s legitimate overseas actions.112
The Committee argues the proper way to address such concerns is not through a
veto of JASTA, but rather by making clear to foreign nations that the United
States will respond to acts of aggression using its “full range of diplomatic,
economic, social, and military” tools.113
While supporters of JASTA may be correct to assume that much of the
international response to JASTA will be grounded in provocation rather than true
reciprocity, this legislation at least gives foreign states the opportunity to claim
reciprocity in an international forum. American financial and material support can
be traced to behavior across the globe that may be deemed terroristic activity by
other countries—for example, Middle Eastern countries may view United States
aid to Israel as terroristic when it results in displacements or killings in the West
Bank; other countries may seek to hold the U.S. accountable for the alleged civilian
attacks perpetrated by United States-backed Syrian rebels; and American airstrikes
that cause civilian deaths, even those targeted at Al Qaeda and the Islamic State,
may be viewed as a form of terrorism.114 The threat of true reciprocal action may be
remote, but that will not stop our adversaries from seizing on this legislation as an
opportunity to respond in kind. The breadth of United States involvement around
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2017–2018

Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism

163


the world leaves us particularly vulnerable to such attacks and means that we have
the most to lose from even the slightest threat of reciprocity, no matter what the
true motivations may be.
iii. Foreign Litigation Would Involve an Intrusive Discovery Process and the Risk
of Extreme Monetary Damages
Defense Secretary Ash Carter expressed concerns about the “intrusive discovery
process” that would result from mere accusations by foreign actors that the United
States provided support for terrorist activities.115 Coupled with this concern,
Secretary Carter outlined the potential that litigants may request sensitive
government information during the discovery process.116 Exposure to foreign
litigation may place the United States in the ill-fated position of choosing whether
to protect classified information or suffer an adverse ruling in a foreign court.117 An
adverse ruling would also create a sizeable risk of extreme money damages being
assessed against the United States and numerous overseas assets potentially being at
risk of seizure to satisfy any judgment.118 Having to defend and strategize against
foreign litigation would divert valuable resources from crucial foreign policy and
national security initiatives.
iv. JASTA Will Complicate Delicate Relationships with Key Allies
One argument, which may be of little concern to the families who lost their
loved ones on September 11, 2001, is that JASTA will interfere in our relationships
with foreign partners. President Obama claimed that JASTA will further
complicate relationships with key allies and undermine trust and cooperation
between the United States and valuable overseas partners who work with the
United States on counterterrorism and national security issues across the globe.119
This concern was also shared by Secretary Carter and a coalition of former national
security and foreign policy professionals.120
While this concern may be easily dismissed by families seeking justice for their
loved ones, the reality is that the United States relies heavily on global allies and the
support of Middle Eastern nations to protect against violent extremism and acts of
terrorism directed against the United States and our allies. While JASTA was
being debated in the Senate, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was privately
warning United States lawmakers that “JASTA would also have a chilling effect on
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the global fight against terrorism.”121 The UAE, and other allies, warned that they
may be forced to curtail the breadth of their intelligence sharing with the United
States if the law were to pass:122 “If a foreign sovereign nation is at risk of being
sued in a US court, even if it’s an ally, that nation will be less likely to share crucial
information and intelligence under [JASTA].”123
The United States must be able to maintain delicate and complex relationships
with its Middle East allies in order to continue to fight against future acts of
terrorism. Even if this concern rings hollow to the 9/11 families, it is a real and
legitimate concern for future United States counterterrorism strategies.
IV. THIS VERSION OF JASTA WILL FAIL TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS IT SEEKS
TO ADDRESS
Reasonable people can disagree about whether a terrorism exception to
sovereign immunity is the best way to seek justice for the 9/11 families; what is
clear though, is that the JASTA bill enacted into law, carries substantial costs and
provides virtually no benefits to 9/11 victims and their families. The original
JASTA bill that passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee would have waived
immunity for foreign sovereigns and allowed suit when the tortious acts took place
overseas and against those who merely aided and abetted acts of terrorism.124 By
contrast, the version of JASTA that passed through Congress provides significant
and likely insurmountable hurdles for the families seeking justice, but it still
represents a symbolic waiver of sovereign immunity that will likely be met with
reciprocal action overseas.
The version of JASTA first passed out of Committee was specifically tailored to
override previous court decisions that had created impediments to the 9/11 families
seeking to bring lawsuits against the Saudis. First, it provided an express grant of
personal jurisdiction in terrorism cases; by contrast, the final version of JASTA
provides no such grant.125 Second, the original JASTA would have amended the
FSIA exception for tortious conduct to allow suit where the conduct occurred
outside of the territorial United States.126 The final version of JASTA did not
include this amendment.127
The first version of JASTA also contained a provision that removed the general
prohibition on suing foreign sovereigns under the ATA.128 Under the final JASTA
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law, this amendment was drastically narrowed. As enacted, JASTA, like the ATA,
prohibits claims against “a foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or an officer
or employee of a foreign state or an agency thereof acting within his or her official
capacity.”129 In fact, the law appears to purposefully exclude foreign sovereigns from
liability under an aiding and abetting theory.130 That said, JASTA does allow suit
against foreign sovereigns in limited circumstances. JASTA suits are permissible:
[I]n any case in which money damages are sought against a foreign state
for physical injury to person or property or death occurring in the United
States and caused by—(1) an act of international terrorism in the United
States; and (2) a tortious act or acts of the foreign state, or of any official,
employee, or agent of that foreign state while acting within the scope of
his or her office, employment, or agency, regardless where the tortious
act or acts of the foreign state occurred.131

As discussed above, however, claims against foreign sovereigns cannot be based
on an aiding and abetting theory of liability.132 Thus, JASTA suits may still only be
based on primary liability, which has already been a significant barrier to 9/11
litigation.
One of the most significant differences between previous versions of JASTA
and the bill that was finally passed comes from Section Five. This new section
creates a procedure under which the United States government can stay any case
under JASTA, potentially indefinitely, if the United States government certifies
that it is “engaged in good faith discussions with the foreign state defendant
concerning the resolution of the claims.”133 The district court appears to have
discretion on whether to grant the initial stay, but after the first stay is granted, the
law requires the court to extend the stay as long as the government continues to


129
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certify it is in good faith discussions with the foreign state defendant.134 Of course,
the district court may deny the initial stay, but past precedent shows federal judges’
willingness to find ways to avoid reaching the merits of these suits, and it seems
unlikely that a court would be willing to allow a suit to proceed when the law gives
them the ability to stop it.135 This stay provision alone will likely end future
attempts to sue foreign sovereigns for terrorism activity, before such suits can even
get off the ground.
In addition to the provisions discussed above, the new JASTA also makes it
harder to prosecute any case if that case could have been brought in an independent
manner. A new amendment to the FSIA under JASTA requires a judge to “stay
any request, demand, or order for discovery on the United States” when the
Attorney General certifies that it would “significantly interfere with . . . a national
security operation.”136 While this only allows the judge to stay discovery requests on
the United States, any claim would not be able to advance as long as this stay
remains in place. Just as the stay created under Section Five of JASTA, this stay
may potentially be imposed indefinitely, creating yet another barrier to meaningful
terrorism litigation under JASTA.
Finally, if a private plaintiff somehow managed to obtain a judgment under
JASTA ⎯ surmounting all the legal hurdles placed in the plaintiff’s way ⎯ the
plaintiff would face even more obstacles when he or she sought to enforce the
judgment. The original JASTA bill was written to modify existing FSIA
exceptions, but the final JASTA created a separate FSIA exception.137 Why does
this matter? The FSIA has a separate provision concerning whether a foreign state’s
property is immune from attachment following a judgment.138 That is to say, even
if a claim is permitted under the FSIA, the property also must be excluded from
attachment immunity under the FSIA in order to use it to satisfy a judgment. The
existing exceptions in the FSIA, to which the original JASTA applied, are exempt
from attachment immunity.139 Thus, if a judgment was obtained under one of those
exceptions, the foreign state’s property would be subject to attachment.140
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Conversely, there is no corresponding attachment immunity exclusion in the new
JASTA;141 therefore, any judgment obtained under the new JASTA section of the
FSIA would not exempt the foreign state’s property from attachment. Whether
this was simply a congressional oversight or an intended obstruction is not clear.
Either way, it provides another significant barrier to terrorism litigation.
To reiterate, while it was entirely reasonable for people to disagree over whether
the benefits of the original JASTA outweighed its likely costs, the final version of
JASTA leaves no room for reasonable disagreement. By passing a bill that
symbolically strips sovereign immunity from any nation that may be accused of
international terrorism, and at the same time creates significant and overwhelming
obstacles to potential litigation, Congress has left the 9/11 families with no
practical means for seeking justice and put our country at risk for reciprocal
treatment from other nations. JASTA is “thus the worst of all worlds.”142
V. NAVIGATING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN A POST-JASTA WORLD

A. Opportunities to Amend JASTA and Mitigate any Unintended Consequences
Only two days after Congress voted to override President Obama’s veto and to
enact JASTA into law, Stephanie DeSimone, whose husband was killed at the
Pentagon on September 11, was the first to file suit.143 The Saudi government
responded, noting that “JASTA is of great concern to the community of nations
that object to the erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity, which has
governed international relations for hundreds of years. The erosion of sovereign
immunity will have a negative impact on all nations, including the United
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States.”144 But, Saudi Arabia is not alone in its condemnation of the new law. The
European Union Delegation to the United States has filed a formal complaint with
the State Department regarding JASTA.145 In it, they argue that the
“implementation of the JASTA would be in conflict with fundamental principles of
international law and in particular the principle of State sovereign immunity.”146
Thus, even before JASTA has been fully implemented, threats of negative
consequences are being expressed by other countries.147 Congress has a duty to act
now, before other nations enact reciprocal laws.
Some have argued that fixing JASTA may be as simple as passing an
amendment that grants the President authority to waive the new terrorism
exception to the FSIA with respect to certain countries.148 After all, there is
precedent for such a move. In 2008, during the Bush Administration, Congress
passed legislation that amended the FSIA but allowed the President to waive the
exception that would have granted plaintiffs the ability to sue Iraq for terrorist acts
committed under the Saddam Hussein regime.149 Similarly, in 1996 Congress
passed legislation that would allow individuals to sue Cuba for trafficking in seized
property, but included a waiver provision that has been used by every president
since its enactment.150 But, given President Trump’s previous comment calling
President Obama’s veto of JASTA a “disgrace,”151 it seems unlikely that he would
sign such an amendment or authorize such a waiver even if available.
Additionally, Congress could pass an amendment that narrows the application
of JASTA to only apply to the attacks of September 11. This option would provide
the families of 9/11 victims the opportunity to file suit while also minimizing any
attempts at reciprocity. It can be argued that the attacks of September 11 are
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unique and passage of such a targeted amendment would make it difficult for
foreign governments to legitimately argue for reciprocity. As currently drafted,
JASTA does not have such a limited scope, but rather applies to the terrorist
attacks of September 11 and any terrorist attacks that occur after.152
Another option would be to limit JASTA’s effects on sovereign immunity by
applying the statute solely to Saudi Arabia. In contrast to JASTA’s broad exception
to sovereign immunity, which could form the basis of a reciprocal act by any
country, a narrower application would limit potential adverse effects.153
Furthermore, “[s]uch a targeted approach would be [more] consistent with what
Congress” has previously done, such as when it enacted a terrorism exception to
sovereign immunity that targeted state sponsors of terrorism.154 Although Saudi
Arabia is not currently on the state sponsors of terrorism list —and likely will not
be placed on it—Congress could go around the executive branch in this limited
case to statutorily allow terrorism suits against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.155
Ultimately, this option would also require Congress to acknowledge the true target
of this legislation; Congressional leaders may not want to make themselves more
accountable for any negative consequences to United States-Saudi relations.156
Some have argued that limiting the legislation to Saudi Arabia alone may not
solve the problem.157 They suggest that instead of using JASTA to “create a new
terrorism exception to the FSIA,” as it currently does, JASTA should amend the
current FSIA tort exception to allow suit where the action occurs outside of the
United States.158 Those in favor of this revision note its many advantages: a tort
exception to sovereign immunity is common in international relations, and,
although the United States interprets its exception to require the “entire tort” to
occur within the United States, this does not appear to be the prevailing
international consensus.159 Additionally, the tort exception has a specific exclusion
for military activities during armed conflicts, which would limit reciprocal laws
from applying to United States military action.160


152

Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, § 7, 130 Stat. 852, 855

(2016).
153
See Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, How to Limit JASTA’s Adverse Impact, LAWFARE
(June 3, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-limit-jastas-adverse-impact
[https://perma.cc/4XRH-5WWL].
154
See id.
155
See State Sponsors of Terrorism, supra note 33.
156
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 153.
157
See, e.g., William Dodge, JASTA and Reciprocity, JUST SECURITY (June 9, 2016, 4:00 PM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/31445/jasta-reciprocity/ [https://perma.cc/V5XK-UTWB].
158
Id. This was a part of the version of JASTA which passed out of committee but was not in the
final JASTA bill passed through Congress. See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040,
114th Cong. § 3 (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 3, 2016).
159
Dodge, supra note 157.
160
See id. The International Court of Justice has ruled that international law requires a territorial
tort exception to sovereign immunity. The practical effect is to create an exemption for torts caused by a
State’s armed forces “in the course of conducting an armed conflict.” Id.; see also Jurisdictional

170

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. I06


Yet another proposed tweak is to allow JASTA suits only where a foreign
sovereign “knowingly engage[d] with a terrorist organization” to carry out an act of
terror.161 This would significantly limit the scope of JASTA and create an
additional legal obstacle before suit is allowed. While some may argue this
amendment would only further weaken the effectiveness of JASTA while
maintaining its risk for international reciprocity, the limitation would assuage some
fear among the United States’ allies that they may become targets of a JASTA suit.
Indeed, there is even some evidence that this change would go a long way in
curbing the anxiety many key Middle Eastern allies felt after the passage of
JASTA.162
The author does not profess to have created an exhaustive list of potential
solutions for JASTA legislation, but there is clearly no shortage of options or ideas.
Congress must act swiftly to resolve concerns of other nations⎯particularly the
concern of United States allies and partners in fighting terrorism overseas. The
JASTA legislation as enacted is wholly inadequate and must be limited to curb any
potential for unintended consequences. However, even if changes are made to this
particular legislation to limit any negative effects, Congress must do more to
prevent the assault on principles of sovereign immunity.

B. Congress Has a Duty to Stop the Erosion of Sovereign Immunity When It
Does Not Benefit United States National Security Interests
Fixing the problems with JASTA will not be enough. The principles of
sovereign immunity must continue to exist to protect the interests of the United
States as it conducts extensive global operations. Only a few days after the passage
of JASTA, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) introduced another piece of legislation
aimed at eroding the doctrine of sovereign immunity.163 Senator Grassley’s new
bill, which would remove immunity for foreign state-owned companies,164 must be
given careful scrutiny by Congress that was lacking in its initial assessments of
JASTA. “Congress should be very cautious about amending legislation, especially
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, to help plaintiffs’ lawyers when they have
lost in court.”165
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The United States has even more incentive for upholding principles of
sovereign immunity when looking at recent actions by the International Criminal
Court (ICC), which, for the first time, appears ready to open an investigation into
alleged crimes committed by United States personnel abroad.166 Specifically, the
ICC is “preparing to launch” an investigation into United States detention
practices in Afghanistan and potentially at “black sites” established in Poland,
Lithuania, and Romania.167 The ICC appears interested in CIA and Department
of Defense activity and whether there was a high-level United States torture
policy.168 How does this relate to sovereign immunity? The United States has never
joined the 1998 treaty that created the ICC⎯the Rome Statute.169 Because the
United States has not participated in the Rome Statute, it has maintained that the
ICC lacks jurisdiction over it.170 Because Afghanistan is a party to the Rome
Statute and has acquiesced to ICC jurisdiction, however, the ICC claims to have
“jurisdiction over American conduct in Afghanistan.”171 The legal arguments
surrounding this issue are beyond the scope of this Note, but, in effect, the ICC is
attempting to pierce United States sovereign immunity by exercising its
jurisdiction. When the United States is engaged in activities that weaken
international principles of sovereign immunity, it weakens its own arguments about
jurisdiction and sovereign immunity in foreign courts, like the ICC. It is in
America’s self-interest to preserve the principle of sovereign immunity.172
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C. Other Ways of Bringing Justice to the 9/11 Families
It is a quintessentially American desire to hold those who cause harm
accountable in a court of law, especially with a tragedy of the magnitude that
occurred on September 11, 2001. As Terry Strada, the leader of a 9/11 Families
& Survivors United for Justice Against Terrorism, put it:
[The passage of JASTA] eases the part where you wake up in the
morning and go to sleep at night and you know that the people that
killed your husband have completely gotten away with it. And now when
I wake up, this morning, I said, the people that killed my husband, they
actually will be held accountable. It’s a very different feeling. It’s a very
satisfying feeling, and it’s the right thing to do for my children and for
our country.173

No matter how fulfilling a lawsuit may feel, it is not always the right course of
action. Particularly in relation to foreign affairs⎯lawsuits brought by individual
plaintiffs should be considered a last resort for deterring foreign government action.
Congress should remember the wide array of existing tools it has at its disposal and
not be so quick to erode international immunity in search of an easy fix. “Sanctions,
trade embargos, diplomacy, [and] . . . military action” can all be used to protect the
American people and deter actions by foreign governments.174
Since the 9/11 attacks, the executive and legislative branches have taken action
to hold accountable those who committed the horrific attacks of that day and to
bring some semblance of closure to the families who lost so much. Steps have been
taken against Al Qaeda, the terrorist group that planned the 9/11 attacks. For
example, President Obama ordered a raid that resulted in the killing of Osama bin
Laden, the leader of that group.175 Legislation has been passed to cover the health
benefits
for
first-responders and survivors of 9/11.176 And trials continue to play out in military
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tribunals against the masterminds behind the September 11 attacks and other
terrorist attacks against the United States.177 Congress should work to enhance
these efforts, build on them, and make them more effective, rather than seek to
violate international principles and allow private litigation. Delegating the
important task of holding those responsible for 9/11 to private plaintiffs and
unelected federal courts is a refrainment of congressional responsibility that will do
significant damage to United States interests abroad.
Even if litigation appears to be the best course of action, there may be other
ways to achieve results without a wholesale waiver of sovereign immunity. For
example, the United States could pressure foreign governments to hold their own
citizens accountable, “support international criminal tribunals” in their prosecution
of international terrorism, and fund programs aimed at promoting the
“international rule of law and victim rehabilitation.”178 This can all be accomplished
without eroding the internationally recognized tenants of sovereign immunity.
Briefly, this Note explores two alternatives to seeking justice for the 9/11 families
that Congress should consider pursuing. This exploration is not meant to be an
exhaustive list but simply to demonstrate the myriad options Congress has at its
disposal.
i. Convince Saudi Arabia to Acquiesce to United States Jurisdiction
It is still far from clear as to whether the Saudis played any role in supporting
the terrorists who carried out the attacks on 9/11.179 Nevertheless, this Note does
not seek to litigate the culpability of Saudi Arabia, but rather to determine the most
effective solution for bringing justice to the victims of terrorism and their families.
To that end, a more desirable outcome could be reached if the Saudi government
was persuaded to hold itself accountable or to acquiesce to American jurisdiction.
The United States has many tools at its disposal to effectuate such cooperation.
For example, the United States currently provides millions of dollars in tax relief to
Saudi Arabians by allowing them to conduct investment activities in the United
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States through their sovereign wealth fund without tax.180 In fact, recent reports
suggest that the Saudis actually expect to invest much more in the United States,
with “plan[s] to grow” their sovereign wealth fund to two trillion dollars.181
Although not all of this money will be invested in the United States, there is reason
to believe that much of it will.182 Such a massive increase in United States
investments by the Saudis would make them eligible for monolithic tax breaks and
financial savings under current law.
It would be entirely within the norms of international relations to leverage these
massive savings the Saudi Arabian government currently receives in order to garner
their cooperation. Such action would not carry with it the threat of reciprocal
action. The United States currently provides these tax benefits as a matter of
statute; thus, they are available to all foreign nations who have sovereign wealth
funds, regardless of whether the United States receives a reciprocal benefit.183 In
fact, many countries do not offer the same benefit to the United States.184
Precedent also exists for singling out Saudi Arabia as ineligible to receive these tax
benefits if it is not willing to cooperate.185 The threat of such a devastating financial
blow to the Saudis would likely be enough to at least bring them to the table to
discuss a joint investigation.
Although this may not be an option Congress is willing to pursue, it should be
considered. The leveraging of existing financial benefits received by Saudi Arabia
does not create the same international concerns that come with an erosion of
sovereign immunity, and it targets only the country that JASTA was designed to
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affect. Such action may further deteriorate the relationship between the United
States and Saudi Arabia, but that relationship has been weakening for some time.186
Regardless, the Saudis rely on us to provide military equipment and support in the
Middle East, and any adverse effects that may result would be superficial and
unlikely to damage the deeper relationship between our two countries. This is just
one of many options the United States has to coerce Saudi Arabia into cooperating
with terrorism investigations—even ones that target the Kingdom directly.
ii. Enact Fund for Victims of Terrorism
A distinct alternative for seeking justice for the 9/11 families could come in the
form of a terrorism victims’ fund for those affected by the September 11 attacks.
Although Congress has already passed legislation to pay for health benefits for the
survivors of these attacks, they could go even further in creating a fund to
compensate victims and families for their loss and suffering.187 Such a fund could
be used to provide money to victims of terrorism while placidly acknowledging the
potential culpability of foreign states in the 9/11 attacks. This would be a more
informal setting for seeking justice, which could potentially involve back-channel
negotiations between the United States and foreign nations such as Saudi Arabia.
It may be useful to think of this option as a settlement agreement between two
foreign nations, where one does not formally admit their guilt, but provides a
mechanism for compensation. The fund may be fronted by the United States
government, while behind the scenes another State is providing the remuneration.
This idea is not a radical departure from legislation that Congress has
previously passed to ensure justice for victims of terrorism. For example, in 2015
Congress passed a budget bill that created a new “United States Victims of State
Sponsored Terrorism Fund.”188 This fund was designed to provide compensation
for the Americans who were held during the 1979 Iranian Hostage Crisis and for
other victims of international terrorism who received final court judgments under
the FSIA exception for state sponsors of terrorism.189 In effect, part of this fund
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was designed to ease the difficulty of collecting on successful judgments against
state sponsors of terrorism by creating a pool of money from which successful
litigants could collect a portion of their judgment.190 However, the portion that was
intended for the victims of the Iranian Hostage Crisis was designed to overcome
existing agreements that prohibited those victims from bringing suit against Iran.191
In the same way, a new 9/11 victims fund could be established to overcome the
international immunity challenges to holding foreign states accountable for their
potential involvement in terrorist attacks on United States soil.
Providing money for these families would certainly not address the deep
suffering they feel from these attacks, but it could provide some form of meaningful
justice. Additionally, the burden of enforcement of any judgment against a foreign
sovereign would be shifted from the 9/11 families to the United States government.
It is likely that the government would be in a better position to collect monies from
these foreign actors than any private citizen. Although the compensation would be
paid initially out of the United States Treasury, the United States could use its full
array of enforcement techniques to recoup at least a portion of these funds. Because
this would involve a foreign state, the United States, seeking compensation from
another foreign state, for example, Saudi Arabia, this would not implicate the
principles of sovereign immunity.
This is not a new idea. The British government already provides compensation
to its citizens who are victims of overseas terrorist attacks.192 Additionally, in 2003,
the Bush Administration proposed a terrorism victim compensation legislation, but
the bill did not advance.193 This legislation would have provided compensation to
victims of the 9/11 attacks equal to the benefits for public safety officers killed in
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the line of duty.194 Rather than eviscerate internationally recognized principles of
sovereign immunity, Congress may consider re-examining this legislation and
enacting a 9/11 victims fund.
CONCLUSION
While it is hard not to feel sympathy for the families of the victims of
September 11, JASTA does not provide them the closure or justice that they need.
Every time the United States enacts a new piece of legislation that chips away at
the longstanding doctrine of sovereign immunity, we must be mindful of the
potential that foreign actors will use our laws as justification to go after our military
members, diplomats, and intelligence operatives working on legitimate government
missions abroad. “[G]iven this country’s global use of intelligence agents, Special
Operations forces and drones, all of which could be construed as state-sponsored
‘terrorism’ when convenient,” it is not far-fetched to believe other countries could
turn the precedent set by JASTA against the United States. 195 “[T]errorism is
often in the eye of the beholder, and reciprocity need not be precise.”196 As Senator
Cardin (D-MD), the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
put it, “While I have faith and confidence in the American legal system, the same
faith does not necessarily extend to the fairness of legal systems of other countries
that may claim they are taking similar actions against America when they are
not.”197
While it is true, as the Supreme Court has said, that “foreign sovereign
immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not
a restriction imposed by the Constitution,”198 we must not rescind its protections
without careful deliberation of the potential ramifications. Congressional leaders
have a duty to reject further assaults on the international principles of sovereign
immunity and to work to narrow the scope of JASTA as much as possible to
minimize its potential for unintended consequences. Justice has been, and will
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continue to be brought, to the families of 9/11 through actions of the executive and
legislative branches.199
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